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CASE NOTES
mergers per se, although such a proscription would be a necessary con-
clusion if the test of anti-competitive effects were one of speculation
and possibility. The existing test of reasonable probability recognizes
that section 7 is not concerned with possibilities. If the government
has not met its burden of showing the reasonable probability of a sub-
stantial lessening of competition, the conglomerate merger should not
be enjoined on the basis of speculative claims. Should investigation into
post-acquisition factors indicate that the proscribed effects exist or will
likely exist in the future, divestiture would be an adequate remedy?' To
grant the motion for injunction would be to substitute what are at best mere
ephemeral possibilities for reasonable probabilities.
GEORGE M. FORD
Antitrust—Clayton Act—Stock Exchange Held Liable under Antitrust
Laws.—Silver v. New York Stock Exchange.' —The New York Stock Ex-
change directed certain of its member firms to terminate private wire con-
nections with the petitioners who were registered broker-dealers= in over-the-
counter municipal bonds, without assigning any reason therefor or giving
the petitioners notice or an opportunity to be heard. The ensuing inability to
receive instantaneous market quotations caused a sharp drop in petitioner's
business. In consequence thereof, a suit was brought in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York° alleging that the
arbitrary action of the Exchange constituted a conspiracy in violation of
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act* thereby entitling petitioners to treble
damages and injunctive relief? The district court held that antitrust laws
applied to the Exchange and granted partial summary judgment, per-
manently enjoining it from interfering with private wire connections between
its members and the petitioner.° On appeal the Second Circuit reversed, hold-
24 Supra note 20.
1 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
2 They were registered with the SEC as broker/dealers pursuant to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. 780(b) (1958). They were also
members of the National Association of Security Dealers, but were not members of the
New York Stock Exchange.
3 Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 196 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
4 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. 1, 2 (1958). Petitioners alleged two additional
causes of action which sounded in tort, based upon allegations that the Exchange
tortiously induced its members to breach contracts for wire connections with petitioners
and also that the Exchange caused petitioners intentional and wrongful harm without
reasonable cause.,
5 These forms of relief are provided by the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15
U.S.C. 15, 26 (1958).
6 Supra note 3. The district court rejected the Exchange's contention that the scheme
of the Act of 1934 was complete regulation and control of all matters relating to
securities transactions and that as a registered Exchange it was therefore part of a
regulated industry exempt from the antitrust laws, at least as to all the rules filed with
the SEC. See note 11, infra.
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ing the Exchange exempt from the restrictions of the Sherman Act! After
granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. HELD •
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 8
 did not give the Exchange a total
exemption from antitrust laws and the Exchange, by denial of notice
and opportunity to be heard, had "plainly exceeded the scope of its
authority under the Securities Exchange Act to engage in self-regulation....' ,0
The Exchange rule of self-regulation, here under scrutiny, is contained
in Article III, Section 6 and Article XIV, Section 17 of the Constitution of
the New York Stock Exchange and in Rules 355 and 356 of the New York
Stock Exchange. This provides, in substance, that the Exchange shall have
power to govern wire services between members and non-members of the
Exchange, including the power to terminate such service at any time. 1 ° These
self-regulatory rules of conduct were adopted pursuant to the mandate of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." The constitutional provisions and
rules relating to private wire connections were conceded by the Court to fall
within the scope of the self-regulatory provisions of the 1934 Act."
7 Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 302 F. 2d 714 (2d Cir. 1962). The court
stated at 720 that:
The statute [Securities Exchange Act of 1934] gives the Commission and the
Exchange disciplinary powers over members of the Exchange with respect to
their transactions in over-the-counter securities and that the policy of the
statute requires that the Exchange exercise these powers fully. In • the exercise
of such powers the Exchange is not subject to the restrictions of the Sherman
Act.
8 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78, et seq. (1958).
° Supra note 1, at 365.
10 The Constitution of the New York Stock Exchange, Article III, § 6 provides
that the Exchange "shall have power to approve or disapprove any application for . . .
wire (service) . . . or other connection between any office of any member of the Ex-
change . . . and any non-member, and may require the discontinuance of any such
service or connection." Article XIV, § 17 provides that the Exchange may order a
member to sever any business connection which might cause the interest or good repute
of the Exchange to suffer. New York Stock Exchange Rule 355 provides that no member
may establish or maintain wire service with any non-member without prior consent
of the Exchange and that the Exchange may require discontinuance of such service
at any time. Rule 356 provides that the Exchange may require discontinuance of any
means of communication whatsoever which has a terminus in the office of a member.
11 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1958). 15 U.S.C. § 78e places
a duty on Exchanges to register with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (3) decrees that
registration could not be granted unless the Exchange submitted copies of its rules to the
SEC. 15 US.C. § 78f(b) states that the registration could not be granted unless the rules
of the Exchange included a provision for expulsion, suspension, or disciplining of a
member for conduct at a proceeding not inconsistent with just and equitable principles
of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (d) decreed that the rules must be just and adequate to insure
fair dealing and to protect investors. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) authorizes the SEC to order
changes in the Exchange's rules respecting a variety of subjects specifically enumerated
therein.
12 Supra note 1, at 355-56.
The Exchange's constitutional provision and rules relating to private wire
connections are unquestionably part of this fulfillment of the [§ 78f(b) and §
78f (d)] duties, for such wires between members and non-members facilitate
trading in and exchange of information about unlisted securities, and such contact
with an unreliable non-member not only may further his business undesirably,
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The Court emphatically indicated this by specifically rejecting the hold-
ing of the district court that the Exchange rules were not sanctioned by the
statutory duty of self-policing.' 3 The Court also pointed out that it was
unavoidable for such rules to be enforced without affecting non-members
of the Exchange." However, the Supreme Court went on to state that the
action of the Exchange was clearly a violation of the Sherman Act unless
justified by reference to the Securities, Exchange Act, and then proceeded
to hold that the latter Act "affords no justification for anti-competitive
collective action taken without according fair procedures." 15 Thus, unless
the restrictive practice is performed pursuant to the Securities Exchange
Act, it violates the Sherman Act. This was clearly indicated when the Court
carefully pointed out that it was not the antitrust laws which imposed the
requirement of notice and hearing, but rather by failing to afford petitioners
these safe-guards "the Exchange [had] plainly exceeded the scope of its
authority under the Securities Exchange Act to engage in self-regulation.""
Since the Exchange could not justify its action under the Securities Ex-
change Act, it had "therefore violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. . . . "17
The application of antitrust law to statutorily regulated industries is
not a novel concept's The problem faced by the courts when confronted with
this issue is one of determining the extent to'which the regulatory legislation
carves out either an express or implied exemption from antitrust prohibitions.
The Supreme Court long ago established the policy that "repeals by implica-
tion are not favored."" In the case under discussion it was necessary for
the Exchange, in order to gain immunity from antitrust law via the Securities
Exchange Act, to demonstrate a clear and "positive repugnancy between the
Provisions of [the Sherman Act and Securities Exchange Act] .. . ; and
even then the old law is repealed by implication only pro tanto to the extent
of the repugnancy."2° There is no language in the Securities Exchange Act
expressly exempting it from any other law, but there is present an implied
immunity in that the Exchange is commanded to promulgate and enforce
restrictive rules. The Court recognized this, but found it not applicable in
the Silver case. The Court was motivated by the lack of substantive "due
but may injure the members or the members' customers on whose behalf the
contact is made and ultimately imperil the future status of the Exchange by
sapping public confidence.
13 Supra note 1, at 356.
14 Ibid.
13 Supra note I, at 364. The "fair procedures" referred to are notice and hearing.
13 Supra note 1, at 365.
17 Ibid.
18 See Hale & Hale, Competition or Control VI: Application of Antitrust Laws to
Regulated Industries, Ill U. Pa. L. Rev. 46 (1962). The authors give an excellent
treatment of the evolution of antitrust application to regulated industries.
19 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 286 U.S. 49, 61-62 (1932);
United States v. Tynem, 78 U.S. (11 Wall) 88, 92 (1870); Henderson's Tobacco v,
United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall) 652, 657 (1870). This policy is summed up clearly in
United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939). The Court states: "It is a cardinal
principle of construction that repeals by implication are not favored. When there are
two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both, if possible."
20 United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 199 (1939).
427
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
process" afforded to petitioner which was concededly absent in the applica-
tion of its rules by the Exchange. 2 ' The majority opinion establishes the
proposition that notwithstanding the statutory propriety of the rules, if
they are enforced under totally unjustifiable circumstances, the Exchange
will suffer the loss of antitrust immunity.
In handling this question of immunity, the precise issue of the avail-
ability to the petitioner of SEC intervention was not directly considered.
It was treated in a footnote22
 wherein the Court indicated that the SEC
may be assumed to have the power under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to direct the Exchange to adopt a general rule providing a hearing and
attendant procedures to non-members. 23
 In a brief filed as amicus curiae,
the Solicitor General of the United States stated that
While neither the Securities Exchange Act nor the Commission's
[SEC] rules of practice specifically authorize the filing of a com-
plaint with the agency by a person adversely affected by a rule of
an exchange, the Commission would ordinarily entertain such a
complaint if it made substantial allegations.24
Thus, the rather interesting issue of "Primary Jurisdiction"26 was
indirectly alluded to but not specifically treated. Could the expertise of the
SEC be asserted to occupy the area of resolution of anti-competitive effects
of Exchange rules on the securities industry? The SEC itself has recognized
that "one of the declared purposes" of the Act (Securities Exchange Act
of 1934) is the "fostering" of competition among exchanges and between
exchanges and the over-the-counter market, "a purpose which is closely
related to the public policy" of antitrust laws." It must be pointed out,
21 The petitioners were given no notice, no hearing nor any reason for the Exchange
action despite repeated requests for the latter two and repeated offerings to come
forward and rebut any allegations as to their reputation, integrity and financial standing.
Supra note 1, at 361.
22 Supra note 1, at 364 n.16.
23 Supra note 1, at 355-56.
24 Brief. .for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 17 nal.
25 The doctrine of "Primary Jurisdiction" arose in Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907). It is a rule concerned with establishing the
proper relationships between the courts and administrative agencies, and is frequently
used by the courts for the resolution of controversies requiring an expertise which a
particular agency possesses. Referral is made to the agency for the "primary" determina-
tion of the issue. E.g. United States v. W. Pac. Ry. Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956); Far East
Conf. v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952). See also, Schwartz, Competition in Regulated
Industries, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 436 (1954).
26 In the Matter of the Rules of the New York Stock Exchange, 10 S.E.C. 270,
286-87 (1941). See also, Hale & Hale, supra note 18, at 48, 50:
The doctrine [Primary Jurisdiction] has often been used by courts to dispose
of antitrust litigation when the subject matter appeared to lie within the
peculiar responsibility of a regulatory agency. Frequently the courts have
utilized the doctrine to afford regulated business an implied exemption from
antitrust control.
. . .
It does not necessarily follow that antitrust principles will not be applied to
these cases which are transferred to the regulatory agencies. The administrative
agency itself may be under a duty to apply antitrust standards.
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Exchange to have deprived petitioner of "fair procedures," thus impliedly
placing a duty on exchanges to observe due process requirements.
In addition to injunctive relief, a strong position could be urged that
petitioner is entitled to damages for breach of the Exchange's duty to afford
due process to an aggrieved party. 32
 Further, there are available the com-
mon law remedies for tortious interference with contractual relations and
wrongful harm without reasonable cause, both of which were included in
petitioner's original declaration. 33
The above alternatives are all predicated upon the assumption that the
Exchange's rule falls within the scope of its statutory duty of self-regulation.
There are other remedies available but it is submitted that antitrust law
and its severe treble damage sanctions is not properly included therein.
JOSEPH J. REARDON
Bankruptcy—Equity vs. State Law in Bankruptcy Courts.—In the Mat-
ter of Harold Laskin, Bankrupt. 1—Laskin, prior to filing a voluntary peti-
tion in bankruptcy, executed a promissory note on which he signed the name
of the corporation of which he was president and his own name. 2 There
was no indication that Laskin's signature appeared in a representative
capacity. The payee subsequently filed a proof of claim and was listed
among scheduled claims, and, upon allegations of fraud, objected to bank-
rupt's discharge. Bankrupt filed exceptions to these objections and received
permission to delete the payee from the list of creditors on the grounds that
the payee was a creditor of the corporation only, not of Laskin personally.
Upon a hearing on the status of the payee the referee found, on the basis of
parol evidence, that at the time of the execution of the note it was intended
that Laskin sign only in a representative capacity, and, hence, that the payee
was not his creditor and lacked standing to object to the discharge. The
district court reverse& holding that the controlling law was the Pennsylvania
Uniform Commercial Code. Parol evidence was inadmissible to show Laskin's
representative capacity.* The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. HELD:
32 See note 29 supra.
33 Supra note 4.
1 316 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1963).
2 Laskin Bros. of Phila. Inc. Harold Laskin. For a discussion of the signature rule
under the UCC and examples thereof see Willier and Hart, Forms and Procedures
Under The Uniform Commercial Code Q 32.07 (1963). See also Uniform Commercial
Code § 3-403(3) (1962 ed.).
3 204 F. Supp. 106 (ED. Pa. 1963). See annot., 4 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 108
(1963).
4 "An authorized representative who signs his own name to an instrument is also
personally obligated unless the instrument names the person represented and shows the
signature is made in a representative capacity." Pa. Stat. tit. I2A § 3-403 (1953). An
amendment to the Code which allows parol evidence to show the representative capacity
as between the immediate parties was in effect in Pennsylvania at the time of the court's
decision. Uniform Commercial Code § 3-403 (1958). The former provisions were in ef-
fect, however, at the date of the note's execution.
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